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A VICTIMLESS SEX CRIME: THE CASE FOR
DECRIMINAIZING CONSENSUAL TEEN SEXTING
Joanna R. Lampe*
As teenagers' access to cellular phones and the internet has increased over the past
two decades, so has their ability to harm themselves and others through misuse of
new technology. One risky behavior that has become common among teenagers is
"sexting"--the digital sharing of sexually suggestive images. To combat the dan-
gers of teen sexting, many states have criminalized the act. Criminalization does
not resolve the issue of teen sexting, however, and in many cases it may cause
additional harm. This Note reviews existing state laws related to teen sexting, and
critiques these laws on constitutional and policy grounds. It then proposes a model
statute to decriminalize consensual teen sexting.
INTRODUCTION
With great power comes great responsibility.1 The rapid develop-
ment of cellular phone and Internet technology over the past two
decades has given users unprecedented power to connect and share
information through digital channels. Unfortunately, teenage users
are not always prepared to use technology responsibly. Teenagers
exploring new technological frontiers often lack firm guidance
from parents and educators, who may not fully understand the new
technologies or their attendant risks. Furthermore, legal controls
over new technologies are often poorly defined or ill-adapted to
deal with emerging challenges. One area where this is particularly
true is sexting.
A product of the digital age, the word "sexting" may be confusing
because it is newly coined 2 and inconsistently used.3 In colloquial
* J.D. candidate, University of Michigan Law School, May 2013. 1 would like to thank
Vivian Chang and Paul Caritj for their invaluable comments during the revision process, and
my parents for their support of this and all my other projects. This Note received the 2012 E.
Blythe Stason Award for the best student contribution in the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform.
1. See, e.g., Tammany is Satisfied, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1892; STAN LEE, AMAZING FANTASY
#15, 11 (1962).
2. Mary Graw Leary, Sexting or Self-Produced Child Pornography? The Dialog Continues-
Structured Prosecutorial Discretion Within a Multidisciplinary Response, 17 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L.
486, 492 (2010) (noting that sexting is a word coined by the media that has been in frequent
use since approximately 2008).
3. Florida's Criminal Code, for example, defines sexting by a minor as "Us[e of] a
computer, or any other device capable of electronic data transmission or distribution, to
transmit or distribute to another minor any photograph or video of any person which depicts
nudity, . . . and is harmful to minors[,]" or possessing such an image. FLA. STAT. ANN.
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use, sexting often refers to any sexually suggestive content sent via
text message. Although messages containing only written text may
sometimes create legal liability,4 the primary legal issue raised by
teen sexting is liability for child pornography, which is limited to
visual depictions. 5 Although sexters often use a cellular phone,
teenagers have also been prosecuted for transmitting sexual images
through other digital media, such as e-mail. 6
In this Note, the word "sexting" refers to the digital transmission
of sexually suggestive or sexually explicit photographs or videos, in-
tended for personal use, through a medium that affords a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy, such as a text message or personal e-
mail. The phrase "sexting image" refers to the sexually suggestive or
sexually explicit photographs or video included in a sext. "Consen-
sual sexting" refers to sexting that occurs with the consent of the
subject of the sexting image, the sender of the image, and the recip-
ient of the image.7
Studies indicate that sexting among teenagers is common. Al-
though only a small minority of teenagers report having produced
and sent sexually suggestive images,8 a higher percentage of
§ 847.0141 (1) (a)-(b) (West 2000 & Supp. 2012). Urban Dictionary, an online dictionary that
features user-generated definitions of slang terms, offers several definitions of sexting, in-
cluding "the act of text messaging someone in the hopes of having a sexual encounter with
them later; initially casual, transitioning into highly suggestive and even sexually explicit";
"When a guy and a girl send dirty text messages back and forth to eachother [sic]. Pictures
may also be included, but only if you're lucky"; and "Sending a text message so long that it
becomes divided into six SMS (text) messages." Urb. Dictionary: Sexting, URaAN DICTIONARY,
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=sexting (last visited Oct. 27, 2012).
4. For example, text-based sexting can constitute sexual harassment. See, e.g., Kurtts v.
Chiropractic Strategies Grp., Inc., No. 09-0712-M, 2011 WL 833978, at *4 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 4,
2011) (holding that "[p]laintiff has demonstrated a prima facie case of hostile environment
because of Dr. Morgan's sexual harassment" by means of sexually suggestive text-only
messages, but finding against plaintiff on other grounds).
5. See Leary, supra note 2, at 494 (citing What Is Sexting? Why Is It a Problem? What Parents
and Teens Need to Know, THE NAT'L CR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN (Sept. 21, 2009),
http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/NewsEventServlet?LanguageCountry-en-
US&Pageld=4131).
6. See, e.g., A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
7. These may not all be different people. For example, it is common for sexters to
create and send images of themselves. See Leary, supra note 2, at 499-501.
8. One study found that 4 percent of teenagers age twelve to seventeen who owned
cellular phones reported sharing sexually suggestive images of themselves via text message.
AMANDA LENHART, TEENS AND SEXTING: How AND WHY MINOR TEENS ARE SENDING SEXUALLY
SUGGESTIVE NUDE OR NEARLY NUDE IMAGES VIA TEXT MESSAGING 2 (2009). Another study
found that 20 percent of teenagers age thirteen to nineteen reported sending electronically
or posting online nude or seminude images or video of themselves. NAT'L CAMPAIGN TO PRE-
VENT TEEN & UNWANTED PREGNANCY, SEX AND TECH: RESULTS FROM A SURVEY OF TEENS AND
YOUNG ADULTS 1 (2008), available at http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/sextech/PDF/
SexTech.Summary.pdf. Note that these surveys only include self-produced sexting images,
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teenagers report having received such images.9 Sexting thus affects
a substantial portion of the teenage population. Both sending and
receiving sexting images can have serious social consequences for
teenagers. 10 In recent years, a number of states have attempted to
resolve the issue, mostly by criminalizing teen sexting.1' However,
this solution is not a fair or effective means of tackling the problems
associated with teen sexting.
This Note analyzes the current state of the law dealing with teen
sexting and proposes reforms that are better adapted to tackling
the problem in an appropriate manner. Part I provides an overview
of the current legal status of teen sexting. Part II raises legal and
policy objections to current laws concerning teen sexting. Part III
advocates decriminalizing consensual teen sexting and offers a
model statute that excludes consensual sexting from criminal liabil-
ity while preserving the option of criminalizing nonconsensual or
exploitative behavior. Part IV responds to potential objections to
this reform.
I. TEEN SEXTING UNDER THE LAW
Because sexting is both a new social phenomenon and a new le-
gal issue, current law on the subject is characterized by rapid
change, uncertainty, and ad hoc application of laws that are poorly
suited to protecting teenagers from the harms of sexting. In these
circumstances, the need for reform is clear.
A. The Social Issue of Teen Sexting
The current generation of teenagers has grown up with an un-
precedented level of digital access. Though it may be too soon to
fully understand the long-term effects of teen sexting, it is clear that
not cases in which one teenager creates and shares an image of another, and thus do not
account for all cases of teen sexting.
9. In Lenhart's study, 15 percent of teenagers age twelve to seventeen who owned cellu-
lar phones reported receiving sexually suggestive images of someone they knew via text mes-
sage. LENHART, supra note 8, at 2.
10. See infra Part I.A.
11. See infta Part I.B. Laws dealing with teen sexting often apply to any minor who en-
gages in the activity, not just minors age thirteen to seventeen, and children as young as
twelve have been threatened with sexting prosecutions. See, e.g., infra note 36. However, cases
involving younger minors are rare. This Note focuses on the minors age thirteen to seven-
teen, who are most likely to be involved in sexting, and uses the term "teen sexting" for
simplicity.
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sexting has the potential to cause a variety of problems for teenag-
ers. These problems can be categorized as those that affect teenag-
ers who appear in sexting images, those that affect teenagers who
receive sexting images, and those that affect the general teenage
population.
Teenagers who appear in sexting images face the risk of embar-
rassment and social stigma if their images are widely shared or pub-
lished.' 2 Because of the extreme ease with which digital images can
be shared, stored, and reproduced, a sexting image intended for
private use can quickly reach a wide audience through a single neg-
ligent transmission. 13 A momentary indiscretion by the subject of a
sexting image may result in a permanent digital record. Once sext-
ing images are in circulation, they can damage a subject's reputa-
tion immediately or cause problems years later if, for example,
potential employers discover the image.
14
Sexting images may also provide a weapon for cyberbullies-bul-
lies who torment their victims over digital channels.' 5 The conse-
quences of cyberbullying can be severe. In the past five years, at
least two teenagers have killed themselves after suffering cyberbully-
ing that included unauthorized sharing of sexually suggestive
images of them.' 6
The problems that sexting images pose for recipients are less se-
vere, but can still be significant. Sexting images may be confusing
or upsetting for teenagers who are not emotionally prepared to
12. See Clay Calvert, Sex, Cell Phones, Privacy, and the First Amendment, 18 CoMMLAw CON-
SPECTUS 1, 23-24 (2009).
13. Transmission is not only quick and easy, it may also be extremely difficult to track.
See Nancy Rommelmann, Anatomy of a Child Pornographer, REAsON, July 2009, at 31-37 ("That
might have been the end of it, had the files not, as digital files will, leaked onto the Internet.
Within a day after Alex[, the recipient of sexts,] saw them, so did [the mother of the girl who
sent them.]").
14. See Calvert, supra note 12, at 24.
15. See Elizabeth C. Eraker, Note, Stemming Sexting: Sensible Legal Approaches to Teenagers'
Exchange of SelfProduced Pornography, 25 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 555, 564 (2010); What Is Cyberbul-
lying Exactly?, STOP CYBERBULLYING, http://www.stopcyberbullying.org/whatiscyberbully
ing.exactly.html (last visited May 1, 2012).
16. Jessica Logan, an eighteen-year-old from Ohio, hanged herself in 2008 after a nude
photo she sent to her boyfriend was forwarded to other teenagers, exposing her to bullying.
Jessica Logan Suicide: Parents of Dead Teen Sue School, Friends over Sexting Harassment, HuF'Fosr
TECH (Mar. 18, 2009, 6:12 AM EDT; updated May 25, 2011, 3:50 PM EDT), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/07/essica-logan-suicide-par_n_382825.html. In 2010, Tyler
Clementi, an eighteen-year-old Rutgers freshman, killed himself after other students filmed
him in a sexual encounter with another male and then shared the video on the Internet.
John Schwartz, Bullying, Suicide, Punishment, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2010 at WK1.
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deal with them. 17 In addition, studies indicate that exposure to sex-
ual content may encourage sexual activity and sexual risk-taking by
teenagers.18 Sexting images may therefore cause both emotional
and physical harm to recipients. Even among adults, who are gener-
ally less sensitive to sexual imagery than minors, unwanted sexting
constitutes sexual harassment. 19 For teenagers, the harm caused by
unwanted sexts may be all the more severe.
20
Sexting images may also pose problems even for minors who are
not directly involved in sending or receiving sexts. Without infor-
mation about the circumstances of their creation, some sexting
images are indistinguishable from inherently exploitative adult-pro-
duced child pornography. 2 1 A central concern related to child por-
nography is that adult child molesters may use it as a tool to
convince children that abusive behavior is normal or acceptable.
22
Although teenagers' consensually created sexting images are not
themselves exploitative, 23 the concern remains that an increased
number of sexually suggestive images of minors may provide addi-
tional material for would-be abusers.
24
17. Lisa Esposito, Teen "Sexting" Common and Linked to Psychological Woes, USA TODAY
(Nov. 5, 2011, 8:00 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/wellness/teen-ya/story/
2011-11-05/Teen-sexting-common-and-linked-to-psychological-woes/51073214/1.
18. REBECCA L. COLLINS, STEVEN C. MARTINO & REBECCA SHAW, INFLUENCE OF NEW MEDIA
ON ADOLESCENT SEXUAL HEALTH: EVIDENCE AND OPPORTUNITIES 9 (2011), available at http://
aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/1 1/adolescentsexualactivity/newmedialitrev/index.pdf.
19. See, e.g., Kurtts v. Chiropractic Strategies Grp., Inc., No. 09-0712-M, 2011 WL 833978,
at *4 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 4, 2011).
20. For a discussion of the particularly serious impact sexting has on youth, see Esposito,
supra note 17.
21. Lawrence G. Walters, How to Fix the Sexting Problem: An Analysis of the Legal and Policy
Considerations for Sexting Legislation, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 98, 114 (2010). See infra Part II.A
for a discussion of the significant differences between consensual teen sexting and adult-
produced child pornography.
22. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 241 (2002).
23. See, e.g., Eraker, supra note 15, at 583; but cf Leary, supra note 2 at 534 ("In self-
produced child pornography real children are exploited."). Leary's argument focuses on the
idea of "self-exploitation." Id. at 498. She defines this term elsewhere as "the creation by a
minor of visual depictions of that minor and/or other minors engaged in sexually explicit
conduct, including the lascivious display of genitals." Id. Leary's choice to define "self-ex-
ploitation" as the production of sexually suggestive images by a minor does not prove that
teen sexting is exploitative. Leary's use of the term departs from standard definitions of ex-
ploitation. See, e.g., Exploitation, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.merniam-
webster.com/dictionary/exploiting (last visited Dec. 20, 2012) (defining exploit as "to make
use of meanly or unfairly for one's own advantage"). Even if we accept that minors can ex-
ploit themselves by producing sexualized images, the resulting harm is different in both type
and degree from that of adult-produced child pornography.
24. Cf Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 250-51 (finding unpersuasive the government's argument
that a ban on virtual child pornography that contained no real children was justified because
of the potential impact that any sexual depiction of children could have on real child abuse).
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Despite these potential dangers, many teenagers are largely un-
concerned with sexting.2 5 Often, teenagers view it as common prac-
tice or just another form of flirting.26 The widespread nonchalance
about sexting among teenagers may stem, in part, from ignorance
of the potential consequences. Of course, not every teenager in-
volved in sexting is traumatized by the experience. 27 Nonetheless,
teenagers need to be informed about sexting and its attendant
risks, and teenagers who receive unwanted sexts deserve some de-
gree of legal protection.
B. Teen Sexting Under State Law
Aware of the significant problems created by teen sexting, prose-
cutors, judges, and lawmakers have begun taking on the challenge
of crafting a suitable legal response.2 8 Nearly all such attempts to
deal with teen sexting have been based in criminal law. Because
general criminal law falls to the states as part of their police
power,29 laws dealing with teen sexting vary from state to state. This
section surveys state laws dealing with teen sexting, looking at both
prosecutions of minors under general child pornography laws and
at new state criminal statutes drafted to deal specifically with teen
sexting.
1. Prosecutions for Teen Sexting
Teen sexting images may be superficially indistinguishable from
exploitative, adult-produced child pornography. In fact, teen sext-
ing images that depict minors constitute child pornography under
25. See Esposito, supra note 17 (reporting that teen sexting is "common," and that 13
percent of teenagers have received sexts and 10 percent have sent them); see generally Rom-
melmann, supra note 13 (telling the story of one teenager who did not understand the conse-
quences of sexting); see also id. at 37 (reporting that to teenagers involved in sexting cases,
sexting images "were not shocking or unusual").
26. NAT'L CAMPAIGN TO PREVFNr TEEN & UNWANTED PREGNANCY, supra note 8, at 4 ("66%
of teen girls and 60% of teen boys [who have sexted] say they did so to be 'fun or
flirtatious.'").
27. Esposito, supra note 17.
28. See infra Part I.B.1-2; see also, e.g., Eraker, supra note 15, at 566-82.
29. U.S. CoNsT. amend. X; see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)
("The amendment states but a truism that all is retained [by the states] which has not been
surrendered [, as enumerated in the Constitution].").
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most state criminal laws,3 0 unless those laws include exceptions writ-
ten specifically to address teen sexting.
31
Sexting can be undeniably harmful to teenagers. 32 However, the
potential harms that arise when teenagers and their peers consen-
sually create and share their own sexting images are different in
kind and degree from the harms that arise from adult production
and distribution of child pornography. 33 Sexting images may be
misused or become a source of regret, but their creation and dis-
semination are not as inherently exploitative as traditional child
pornography.
Despite this essential difference, application of general child por-
nography laws to teen sexting is not purely hypothetical. Prosecu-
tors in at least a dozen states have brought child pornography
charges against teenagers for sexting.34 Past teenage defendants in-
cluded a couple who took photos of themselves engaged in sexual
activity and e-mailed them from one personal computer to an-
other,35 two twelve-year-old girls who took photos of themselves in
training bras at a slumber party,36 and a sixteen-year-old boy who
received unsolicited, partially nude photos of a fourteen-year-old fe-
male schoolmate.
37
Although all of these cases involved sexually suggestive images of
minors, the nature of the images at issue was very different from
exploitative, adult-produced child pornography. In all three cases,
the images were produced not only with the consent of the minor
subjects, but of their own initiative. The intended audiences were
30. See Megan Sherman, Note, Sixteen, Sexting, and a Sex Offender: How Advances in Cell
Phone Technology Have Led to Teenage Sex Offenders, 17 B.U.J. Sci. & TECH. L. 138, 142 (2011)
("[Ulnder a majority of current state laws, a teen who uses a cell phone to take, send, or keep
a sexually explicit photo of a friend or significant other, who just so happens to also be a
minor, may be charged with production, dissemination, and possession of child pornogra-
phy."). These charges are generally felonies, with penalties ranging from six months to life in
prison. Id. at 143-44. Although my research has uncovered no examples of teenagers receiv-
ing long prison sentences for consensual sexting, prosecutors have used the threat of felony
charges to push teenagers into diversion programs. See, e.g., Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139
(3d Cir. 2010).
31. See infra Part I.B.2.
32, See supra Part I.A.
33. See Terri Day, The New Digital Dating Behavior-Sexting: Teens' Explicit Love Letters:
Criminal Justice or Civil Liability, 33 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 69, 85-86 (2010).
34. See Dahlia Lithwick, Teens, Nude Photos, and the Law, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 13, 2009, at 18.
35. A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) ("The State alleged that,
while the photos were never shown to a third party, A.H. andJ.G.W. e-mailed the photos to
another computer from A.H.'s home."). It is unclear from the case how the photos were
discovered.
36. Associated Press, Pa. Court Sees First US 'Sexting' Case, Bos. GLOBE,Jan. 16, 2010, at A2,
available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2010/01/16/pennsylvania-court_
sees_first_ussexting_case/ [hereinafter Pa. Court Sees First US 'Sexting' Case].
37. See Rommelmann, supra note 13, at 32.
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members of the subjects' peer groups whom they knew personally,
not adults. In the case of the slumber party photo of girls in train-
ing bras, the image at issue was arguably not even pornographic-
the mother of one of the girls "thought her daughter Marissa and
friend Grace Kelly were being 'goofballs' in the 2007 slumber-party
shot" and argued that "[y]ou're going to see more provocative
photos in a Victoria's Secret catalog."
38
The outcomes of teen sexting prosecutions vary widely, from
mandatory participation in educational diversion programs,3 9 to
plea bargains, 40 convictions, 41 or, in at least one case, an injunction
against prosecution.42 A more consistent feature of these cases is
that the sexting that triggered prosecution had caused minimal or
no harm to others.43 Another feature is the shock of the families of
the involved children upon learning that consensual sexting could
expose minors to criminal charges. 44 Prosecutors who pursue por-
nography charges against teen sexting may intend to deter such be-
havior by making an example of a few teenagers. Parents, legal
commentators, and members of the community have reacted nega-
tively to this strategy.45 But in states without specialized teen sexting
statutes, this approach is firmly within the letter of the law.
38. Pa. Court Sees First US 'Sexting' Case, supra note 36.
39. See Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 143-45 (3d Cir. 2010).
40. Rommelmann, supra note 13.
41. A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). A.H. was convicted in
juvenile court for "producing, directing or promoting a photograph or representation that
she knew to include the sexual conduct of a child." Id.
42. Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 646 (M.D. Pa. 2009).
43. The only case among those mentioned above in which sexting arguably harmed
someone other than the teenage defendant is the case of the sixteen-year-old boy who re-
ceived photos from a classmate. The boy was charged after the photos leaked into wider
distribution. The girl, who created and sent the images, was not charged. The girl was not
interviewed for the article, but the author reports that, for the teenagers involved, the images
"were not shocking or unusual." Rommelmann, supra note 13, at 37. The boy said of their
relationship after the case, "I see her .... We don't let it faze us." Id.
44. Cf Mike Brunker, "Sexting" Surprise: Teens Face Child Porn Charges, MSNBC.coM (Jan.
15, 2009, 8:03 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28679588 (explaining that prosecuting
sexting teenagers is beyond the intended purposes of child pornography statutes).
45. Rommelmann, supra note 13, at 36-37; see also Robert H. Wood, The Failure of Sexting
Criminalization: A Plea for the Exercise of Prosecutorial Restraint, 16 MICH. TELECOMm. & TECH. L.
Ray. 151, 176 (2009) (commending those states that take a more measured approach to
punishment for sexting); 'Sexting' OverkilL Prosecuting Teens for Sending Nude Photos Ignores the
Fact that These Are Kids Doing a Pretty Common Thing, INQUIRER, Apr. 6, 2009, http://articles.
philly.com/2009-04-06/news/25286780_1_sexting-nude-photos-teens.
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2. State Legislation
Prompted by high profile teen sexting cases in the courts, some
state legislatures have realized that existing law is ill-equipped to
handle teen sexting. Thirty-two states have enacted or proposed
statutes specifically aimed at teen sexting that would otherwise qual-
ify as child pornography.46 These statutes uniformly provide for re-
duced penalties for teenagers who sext, relative to sentences under
child pornography laws. However, they also preserve the possibility
of prosecution, either in the juvenile justice system or in adult crim-
inal court.
47
The criminal offense level of teen sexting varies from state to
state. New laws enacted in Florida and Nevada and a law proposed
in South Dakota all treat the first instance of sexting by a minor as a
noncriminal offense, but subject a minor who reoffends to crim-
inal prosecution. 4 Five states have reduced teen sexting to a
46. As of August 12, 2012, seventeen states have enacted laws dealing specifically with
teen sexting. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-309 (West Supp. 2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-
196h (West 2007 & Supp. 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.0141 (West 2000 & Supp. 2012);
S. 2222, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2012); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/3-40 (West 2011);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:81.1.1 (Supp. 2011); Mo. REV. STAT. § 589.400 (West 2011); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 28-813.01, 28-1463.03-.05 (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.737 (2011); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:4A-71.1 (West 2011); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 458-1 (McKinney 2011); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-202.3 (2011) (criminalizing a narrow category of teen sexting in a statute aimed at
older teenagers and adults); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-9-1.4 (Supp. 2011); S. 183, 88th Sess. (S.D.
2012); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3.261 (West 2011 & Supp. 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-10-
1204, -1206 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2802b (2009).
Fifteen other states have proposed teen sexting legislation. H. 127, 27th Leg., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Alaska 2011) (passed with sexting provisions removed); Assem. 321, 2011 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2011), Assem. 1043, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011), S. 916, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2011); S. 919, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011); H. 1042, 117th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Ind. 2011); see also Charlotte Eby, Changes to Teen 'Sexting' Laws Being Drafted,
WCFCOURIER.COM (Jan. 8, 2010, 5:30 AM), http://wcfcourier.com/news/local/govt-and-
politics/article_50c481b2-bee-Ilde-9710-001cc4c03286.html (describing the Iowa Attorney
General's plan to propose new, more lenient teen sexting laws); S. 63, 2011 Leg. Reg. Sess.
(Kan. 2011) (passed with sexting provisions removed); H. 57, 2010 Leg., 10th Reg. Sess. (Ky.
2010), H. 143, 2010 Leg., 10th Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2010); H. 643, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss.
2010); H. 1562, 2012 Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2012); H. 53, 129th Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess.
(Ohio 2011); H. 2006, 53rd Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2011); S. 677, 76th Leg. Ass., Reg. Sess. (Or.
2011); H. 2189, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2010); H. 4504, 118th Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. (S.C.
2010); S. 179, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2011); H. 4483, 80th Leg. 2d Sess. (W.Va. 2012).
47. See id.
48. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.0141 (West 2000 & Supp. 2012); NEV. REv. STAT. § 200.737
(2011); S. 179, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2011).
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misdemeanor, 49 and seven others have proposed to do so.50
Three states encourage referral of teen sexting cases to juvenile
proceedings or family court,51 and four allow teenagers who sext to
enter diversionary programs instead of facing other criminal sanc-
tions.52 These reforms suggest an emerging trend away from crimi-
nal punishment for sexting. Nonetheless, five states have acted
proactively to criminalize teen sexting, apparently regardless of
consent or other factors, such as actual or potential harm to the
teenagers involved.
53
Most states have provided for lesser penalties for teen sexting by
leaving adult child pornography laws unchanged and creating new
offenses with less severe penalties for minors who sext.54 Nebraska's
legislature has gone one step further. Leaving in place its existing
child pornography law, it created an affirmative defense that en-
tirely immunizes private, consensual sexting between minors over
the age of fifteen and defendants under the age of nineteen from
criminal liability.
55
Except Nebraska's, none of the other new teen sexting laws treats
consensual and nonconsensual sharing of sexting images differ-
ently. As originally introduced, the statute proposed in Illinois dis-
tinguished offense levels based on a sharer's intentions in obtaining
49. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-309 (West Supp. 2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-196h
(West 2007 & Supp. 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.0141 (West 2000 & Supp. 2012); TEX. PE-
NAL CODE ANN. § 43.261 (West 2011 & Supp. 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-10-1204, -1206
(LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2011).
50. H. 2189, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2010); H. 53, 129th Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. (Ohio
2011); H. 573, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2011); H. 57, 2010 Leg., 10th Reg. Sess. (Ky.
2010), H. 143, 2010 Leg., 10th Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2010); H. 2006, 53rd Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla.
2011); S. 677, 76th Leg. Ass., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2011); H. 4504, 118th Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. (S.C.
2010).
51. R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-9-1.4 (Supp. 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2802b (2009); H. 53,
129th Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011). Absent specialized sexting provisions, teenagers
facing child pornography charges can often be tried as adults. SeeJulia Halloran McLaughlin,
Crime and Punishment: Teen Sexting in Context, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 135, 139 (2010) (cit-
ing A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Washington v. A. Vezzoni, 127
Wash. App. 1012 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005)). Many states automatically charge anybody age sev-
enteen or older as an adult, and younger teenagers may also be tried in adult court. ELIZA-
BETH S. ScoTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 4 (2008). Although this
practice initially targeted violent offenders, "[o]f the more than 250,000 individuals under
eighteen years of age who are tried as adults each year in the United States, only about half
are accused of violent crimes." Id.
52. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-71.1 (West 2011); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 458-1 (McKinney
2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2802b (2009); H. 4504, 118th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C.
2010).
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.3 (2011); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.261 (West 2011 &
Supp. 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2802b (2009); H. 53, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Ohio 2011); H. 4504, 118th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2010).
54. See, e.g., statutes compiled supra note 46.
55. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-813.01, 28-1463.03-.05 (2011).
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or sharing images. 56 By making only malicious sharing subject to
increased penalty, the bill ensured that most consensual sexting,
and all sharing of images depicting the sharer, would fit under the
lesser offense. This distinction based on intent was valuable, but it
did not go far enough-teenagers who engaged in consensual sext-
ing remained liable for at least a misdemeanor, even for taking pic-
tures of themselves.57 Moreover, the bill was ultimately amended,
and the statute as passed does not make a distinction based on
intent.
5
Five of the new and proposed laws dealing with teen sexting ex-
empt teenagers convicted of sexting-related offenses from sex of-
fender registration.59 State laws that reduce the level of offenses
associated with teen sexting 6 or exempt teenagers from sex of-
fender registration also allow the teenagers to avoid registration
under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, a federal
law that mandates sex offender registration following convictions
for certain sexting-related offenses.6 1 Removing these registration
requirements reduces the risk that teenagers who sext will face life-
long legal consequences. Taking steps such as reducing penalties
and moving away from incarceration for teenagers who sext without
56. The bill made it a misdemeanor for minors either to knowingly disseminate nude
images of minors-whether of themselves or of other minors-or to request that another
minor disseminate such images. If a minor obtained images or published them online with
the intent to harm another minor's reputation, the offense was raised to a felony. All of these
offenses carried the risk ofjail time. H.B. 4582, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2010).
57. Id.
58. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-27 (2011).
59. NEv. REv. STAT. § 200.737 (2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2802b (2009); H. 53,
129th Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011); S. 179, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2011); cf Mo. Rev.
STAT. § 589.400 (West 2011) (allowing minors to petition to be removed from the sex of-
fender registry after two years).
60. For example, a state may lower a felony offense to a misdemeanor.
61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 16911-29 (2006). The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act,
also known as the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) is a federal stat-
ute that aims to standardize the system of sex offender registration throughout the United
States. Registration requirements do not apply to all juvenile offenders. The act only man-
dates registration by juvenile offenders above the age of fourteen who are tried as adults and
convicted of crimes classified as tier three offenses-the most severe category. Id. However,
tier three juvenile offenders charged as adults, like tier three adult offenders, must register
for life, must re-register every three months, and must have their registration posted publicly
on the Internet. Id. Some sexting-related charges qualify as tier three offenses. See Stephanie
Gaylord Forbes, Sex, Cells, and SORNA: Applying Sex Offender Registration Laws to Sexting Cases,
52 WM. & MARY L. Rev. 1717, 1732 (2011). Thus, absent provisions exempting teenage
sexters from registration, a criminal conviction for sexting can have lifelong legal conse-
quences for teenagers as young as fourteen.
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intent to harm others may also make sexting prosecutions less dis-
proportionately harmful. However, teenagers who sext continue to
face the threat of criminal prosecution in every state.
62
II. THE NEED FOR REFORM
Though some states have concluded that teen sexting is a legal
challenge in need of a targeted solution, many states still do not
have laws on the subject.63 Even in states that have laws that address
consensual teen sexting, the need for reform remains because, in
every state, prosecution in adult or juvenile court remains a possi-
bility for minors who sext.64 The possibility of an adult criminal con-
viction or delinquency adjudication for teen sexting raises serious
constitutional questions. 65 Furthermore, even if prosecution of
teenagers for sexting is constitutional, there are a number of policy
reasons to refrain from punishing consensual teen sexting.66 This
section examines the constitutional and policy rationales that
demonstrate the need for further reform of teen sexting laws.
A. Constitutional Questions About Sexting Prosecutions
The United States Constitution includes protections for freedom
of speech and expression, 67 sexual privacy,68 and the right of par-
ents to guide the upbringing of their children. 69 Teen sexting falls
at the intersection of these three rights. As a result, there is a com-
pelling argument that consensual teen sexting is a sphere of pro-
tected activity into which criminal law should not intrude.
62. Every state has laws criminalizing child pornography. 50 State Statutory Surveys:
Child Pornography, 0030 SURVEYS 5 (Thompson Reuters/West 2009). The state laws dis-
cussed above carve out limited exceptions to the default child pornography law, but in every
case they preserve the possibility of prosecution, though prosecution may be postponed until
a teenager reoffends. See supra note 46.
63. See supra Part I.B.2.
64. See supra note 62.
65. See infra Part II.A.
66. See infra Part II.B.
67. See infra Part II.A.1.
68. See infra Part II.A.2.
69. See id.
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1. The First Amendment
The First Amendment provides, in part, that "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech ... ."70 This right
has been incorporated against the states and is now understood to
apply to any government actor.71 The First Amendment's scope has
been interpreted broadly.72 Not only spoken and written words but
also art,73 movies and broadcast media,74 music, 75 and some forms
of expressive conduct 76 fall under the umbrella of protected expres-
sion. Sexual imagery is considered a form of expression under the
First Amendment and, thus, it too is generally protected.
77
The First Amendment's scope is subject to a limited number of
categorical exceptions. 78 Two of these exceptions are relevant to
teen sexting: obscenity and child pornography. Obscenity has long
been viewed as an exception to First Amendment protection. 79 The
current standard for obscenity was declared in Miller v. California, in
which the Supreme Court held that a state may criminalize works
which, "taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex,
which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and
which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, politi-
cal, or scientific value."80
The Miller standard has been applied narrowly, meaning that
while some sexting images might rise to the level of obscenity under
70. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
71. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) ("For present purposes we may and do
assume that freedom of speech and of the press-which are protected by the First Amend-
ment from abridgment by Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liber-
ties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by
the States.").
72. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ("All ideas having even the slightest
redeeming social importance-unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to
the prevailing climate of opinion-have the full protection of the guaranties, unless excluda-
ble because they encroach upon the limited area of more important interests.").
73. Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1973)
74. Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) ("[M]otion pictures [and] pro-
grams broadcast by radio and television . .. fall within the First Amendment guarantee.").
75. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) ("Music, as a form of expres-
sion and communication, is protected under the First Amendment.").
76. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969) (holding
that students wearing black armbands to school to protest the Vietnam War engaged in ex-
pressive conduct entitled to First Amendment protection).
77. Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) ("Sexual expression
which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment.").
78. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
79. E.g., id. at 572; Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
80. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
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this standard, sexually explicit images of teenagers do not automati-
cally qualify as obscene.8' Teen sexting images mentioned in the
sexting case law generally depict only nudity or partial nudity,
rather than self-produced hardcore pornography.82As such, most
teen sexting images are not excluded from First Amendment pro-
tection under the Miller standard.
The First Amendment exception that is more likely to apply to
teen sexting is the exemption for child pornography, first recog-
nized in New York v. Ferber.8 3 In Ferber, the Supreme Court held that
states may criminalize child pornography that falls outside the
Miller definition of obscenity.8 4 The Constitution requires only that
"the conduct to be prohibited must be adequately defined by the
applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed. [Of-
fenses must] be limited to works that visually depict sexual conduct
by children below a specified age. The category of 'sexual conduct'
proscribed must also be suitably limited and described."8 5 Under
the plain language of Ferber, most teen sexting images may be
criminalized as child pornography.
However, there is reason to believe that, despite Ferber, the First
Amendment should protect consensual teen sexting, because con-
sensual sexting does not implicate the core interests at stake in Fer-
ber. Support for this argument comes from Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, which held that the First Amendment protects virtual
child pornography.8 6 In so holding, Ashcroft narrowed the scope of
Ferber in ways that are relevant to teen sexting.
In Ashcroft, the Supreme Court revisited the interests served by
the Ferber exception, and noted that bans on production and distri-
bution of child pornography were justified
81. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 235 (2002) (noting that "[plictures of
what appear to be seventeen-year-olds engaging in sexually explicit activity do not in every
case contravene community standards" and thus do not always rise to the level of speech that
may be criminalized).
82. The Court in Miller implied that most or all "hard core pornography" could be
criminalized as obscene. 413 U.S. at 27. However, the term "hard core pornography" does
not have a precise legal definition. As Justice Douglas wryly noted in dissent, even when
dealing with hard core pornography, "a true definition is lacking. It has indeed been said of
that definition, 'I could never succeed in (defining it) intelligibly,' but 'I know it when I see
it.' " Id. at 39 (Douglas,J, dissenting) (quotingJacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (Stewart,
J., concurring)). However, at minimum, the language "sexual conduct" seems to imply some
sexual activity that goes beyond sexually suggestive nudity. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
83. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
84. Id. at 764.
85. Id. (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted).
86. 535 U.S. at 234, 256. Virtual child pornography consists of images "that appear to
depict minors but were produced by means other than using real children, such as through
the use of youthful-looking adults or computer-imaging technology." Id. at 234.
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because these acts were 'intrinsically related' to the sexual
abuse of children in two ways. First, as a permanent record of a
child's abuse, the continued circulation itself would harm the
child who had participated. Second, because the traffic in
child pornography was an economic motive for its production,
the State had an interest in closing the distribution network.
8 7
The Court emphasized that "Ferbers judgment about child pornog-
raphy was based upon how it was made, not on what it
communicated."
88
Creating actual child pornography is an act of child abuse, and
the continued existence of child pornography perpetuates the
harm of that abuse. Ashcroft established that these are the legally
relevant attributes that allow states to criminalize child pornogra-
phy. Although other interests at stake in Ferber remained relevant to
the virtual child pornography in Ashcrofi,89 the difference in how
virtual child pornography is made was sufficient to render a ban on
that material unjustified and prohibited under the First
Amendment.90
Like the virtual child pornography at issue in Ashcroft, consensu-
ally created teen sexting images are not records of child abuse, be-
cause the process of making them is not harmful or coercive. The
continued circulation of these images may cause embarrassment or
social stigma for their subjects but does not perpetuate the trauma
of child abuse as adult-created child pornography does. In addition,
teen sexting is not a commercial activity, so there can be no "eco-
nomic motive for its production" that would generate a state inter-
est in imposing a ban.9' Thus the factors that weighed in favor of
First Amendment protection for virtual child pornography in Ash-
croft also support the same protection for teen sexting.
While this argument is in line with the Supreme Court's child
pornography jurisprudence, precedents in other areas may weigh
against it. As a general matter, states have greater constitutional lee-
way in regulating children than adults.92 In particular, there is pre-
cedent indicating that children's speech rights are entitled to less
87. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 235 (2002) (internal citations
omitted).
88. Id. at 236.
89. For example, the Court did not deny that virtual child pornography might be used
by pedophiles to seduce children, but instead noted that this use of the materials was itself a
crime, and the potential for misuse could not justify a blanket ban. Id.
90. Id. at 254-56.
91. Id. at 235.
92. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) ("The state's authority over
children's activities is broader than over like actions of adults.").
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First Amendment protection than those of adults.93 However, limi-
tations on minors' speech rights have not generally involved crimi-
nal punishment of minors for expression. Instead, punishment is
meted out to adult guardians who allow children's expression to
put the children at risk.94 Alternatively, minor speakers may receive
less severe sanctions, such as in-school discipline.95 Despite the
broader allowance for constitutional limits on their speech rights,
teenagers retain rights to freedom of expression that should not be
infringed by criminal sanctions for sexting.
2. The Right to Privacy
In addition to freedom of speech, the Constitution protects the
right to privacy through the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 96 This protection embraces substantial rights to sexual
privacy, including the right of consenting adults to engage in same-
sex sexual activity97 and the right to access to birth control.9 The
latter right has been explicitly extended to minors.99 Like the right
to freedom of expression, the right to sexual privacy is also poten-
tially implicated by laws that criminalize teen sexting.
Teen sexting is, under the definition adopted by this Note, sex-
ual expression that is intended to be private. In Lawrence v. Texas,
the Supreme Court announced: "When sexuality finds overt expres-
sion in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be
but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring."100 De-
spite the Court's lofty language, the facts of Lawrence indicate that
the protection of "overt expression in intimate conduct"'' extends
to sexual activity outside the context of a committed relationship. 102
93. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) ("The First Amend-
ment guarantees wide freedom in matters of adult public discourse.... It does not follow,
however, that simply because the use of an offensive form of expression may not be prohib-
ited to adults making what the speaker considers a political point, the same latitude must be
permitted to children in a public school.").
94. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 168 (upholding a Massachusetts law that penalized parents,
custodians, and others who permit minors to sell magazines in streets or public places).
95. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682.
96. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977).
97. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
98. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
99. Carey, 431 U.S. at 678.
100. 539 U.S. at 567.
101. Id.
102. Dale Carpenter, The Unknown Past of Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REv. 1464,
1478 (2004) (noting that one commentator believes that "[the Lawrence defendants) may
have been occasional sexual partners, but were not in a long-term, committed relationship
when they were arrested.").
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Sexting, while not physical sexual activity, is another such "overt
expression" of sexuality.
Given the ease with which digital images can be shared, the rea-
sonableness of the expectation of privacy for sexting is an open le-
gal question.10 3 However, the fact that unauthorized sharing may
put sexting images into broader circulation should not negate the
privacy interest of teenagers who create or appear in those
images.10 4 Just as the presence of police officers in the house in
response to a false report did not properly expose the Lawrence de-
fendants to liability for private sexual conduct in the home, 10 5 teen-
agers should retain their constitutional privacy rights even if their
messages are ultimately disseminated. In either case, it is not the
actions of the people principally involved but rather misconduct by
a third party that brings private behavior to official attention. As-
suming that teenagers intend their sexts to be private and take rea-
sonable steps to keep them so, their activities are largely similar to
the private sexual activity protected in Lawrence.
Not all rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment fully ex-
tend to minors. In fact, in Lawrence the Court specifically disclaimed
that the right it enunciated applied to children.10 6 However, given
the general landscape of legal precedent in the area of sexual pri-
vacy, the Lawrence exclusion should not extend to teen sexting. As
the Supreme Court stated in Carey v. Population Services International,
"[s] tate restrictions inhibiting privacy rights of minors are valid only
if they serve 'any significant state interest that is not present in the
case of an adult.' 107 Carey further held that a state policy of dis-
couraging sexual activity among minors did not justify invasion of
minors' Fourteenth Amendment privacy rights.
108
In Lawrence, the Court did not explain why it exempted minors
from its holding. It may simply have wished to avoid reaching facts
103. In A.H. v. State, the majority found that there was no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in sexting. 949 So. 2d 234, 237 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); but see id at 240 (Padovano, J,
dissenting) ("That the Internet is easily hacked, as the majority says, is not material. The issue
is whether the child intended to keep the photos private, not whether it would be possible for
someone to obtain the photos against her will and thereby to invade her privacy.").
104. Id. at 240 (Padovano, J., dissenting)
105. See Carpenter, supra note 102, at 1485-87 (explaining that officers entered Law-
rence's house based on a report that "a black male was going crazy in the apartment and he
was armed with a gun" but instead found two men engaged in sexual activity).
106. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) ("The present case does not involve minors. It does not
involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where
consent might not easily be refused.").
107. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977) (quoting Planned
Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)).
108. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 694-95.
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not presented in the case. Carey arguably dictates that if a teen sext-
ing case reached the Supreme Court on privacy grounds, the activ-
ity would be protected, absent a significant state interest that is
unrelated to suppression of sexual activity by minors. Such an inter-
est might exist, but it is not obvious or easily defensible.
Another possible response to the reduced constitutional protec-
tion afforded to minors' sexual privacy is to argue that teen sexting
implicates multiple rights at once, and that the combination of
these interests obliges the state not to interfere. One commentator
has crafted a novel argument of this sort at the intersection of teen-
agers' privacy rights and the rights of parents to direct their chil-
dren's education and development. 10 9 Citing Meyer v. Nebraska10
and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,l t' he argues:
Absent a compelling state interest, many choices and decisions
that affect children must be preserved for their parents regard-
less of how the state may judge the correctness of such deci-
sions. Thus, it may be perfectly acceptable that the
government would wish that the nation's teens would refrain
from sexting, but it may lack the power to prohibit the activity
through criminal sanction.
112
He combines this interest with what he calls "Lawrence's seeming
rational basis with bite" to argue that, together, the two interests
weigh strongly against government interference in the realm of
teen sexting.1
13
This argument draws connections between rights that have not
intersected on the facts of previous Supreme Court cases, and it is
unclear whether the argument would prevail in ajudicial challenge
to teen sexting laws. However, the doctrinal interests at issue are
substantial. Parents' rights to guide their children's upbringing,
along with teenagers' rights to sexual privacy and freedom of ex-
pression all counsel against criminalizing consensual teen sexting.
It is important to note that in finding that teen sexting may not
be criminalized, a court need not recognize a fundamental "right to
109. Claudio J. Pavia, Constitutional Protection of "Sexting" in the Wake of Lawrence: The
Rights of Parents and Privacy, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 189, 200 (2011).
110. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that a state statute that forbade instruction in a foreign
language violated "the right of parents to engage [a teacher] to instruct their children [in
German]").
111. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that a statute compelling attendance at public rather
than private school infringed "the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing
and education of children").
112. Pavia, supra note 109, at 198.
113. Id. at 202.
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sext." Commentators have disavowed this notion 1, 4 and it is under-
standably unpalatable. But to recognize constitutional rights in this
area is not to give teenagers license to misbehave. Other avenues
for control and education remain.11 5 This Note argues only that
sanctions in the criminal and juvenile justice systems have no place
in efforts to protect teenagers from the self-imposed harm of con-
sensual sexting.
B. Policy Reasons for Reform
Even if criminal prosecution of consensual teen sexting is held to
be constitutional despite the concerns outlined above, there are
also compelling policy concerns that weigh against criminalization
and prosecution. This section argues that criminal prosecution of
consensual teen sexting is fundamentally unfair because sexting
does not constitute a wrong deserving of criminal punishment. It
reinforces this claim by demonstrating that the traditional justifica-
tions for criminal punishment do not support criminal prosecution
of teen sexting.
1. Consensual Sexting is not a Wrong Deserving of Punishment
The law generally distinguishes criminal punishment from a simi-
lar civil sanction by "the judgment of community condemnation
which accompanies and justifies its imposition."" 6 The hallmark of
criminal law, then, is its ability not merely to punish but also to
express the belief that the punished act was morally reprehensible.
Once a punishable wrong is identified, the punishment dispensed
should be proportionate to the crime.1 7 Criminal prosecution for
consensual teen sexting is unjustified on both of these grounds.
Sexting is not a wrong worthy of expressive condemnation. In the
absence of such a wrong, no criminal punishment can be appropri-
ate or proportionate.
114. Is 'Sexting' a Teen's Right?, CNN (Mar. 30, 2009), http://edition.cnn.com/video/#/
video/bestoftv/2009/03/30/pn.sexting.right.cnn (last visited Dec. 20, 2012).
115. See infra Part IV.
116. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404
(1958).
117. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
86-88 (John Bowring ed., 1843). This limit is not only moral but also constitutional. See
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (holding that the Eighth Amendment requires
that "the sanction imposed cannot be so totally without penological justification that it results
in the gratuitous infliction of suffering").
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Immanuel Kant argued that "[j]uridical punishment never can
be administered merely as a means for promoting another
[g]ood . . . but must in all cases be imposed only because the
individual on whom it is inflicted has committed a [crime." 8 To jus-
tify criminal sanction, the accused "must first be found guilty and
punishable."' 9 But what about teen sexting makes it a wrong that
merits criminal condemnation?
A teenager who creates a personal sexting image and freely
shares it with a willing recipient does not harm anyone else. This
behavior may put the sexter at risk of reputational damage, but that
potential harm depends on the wrongful act of another person who
shares the image more widely than originally intended. 20 Even if
we believe that the elevated risk is itself a harm, it is one that sexters
inflict on themselves. Furthermore, consensual sexting is generally
not intended to cause harm. Teenagers create and share sexting
images to feel fun or flirty, not with the culpable aim of causing
trouble or putting themselves at risk.
A teenager who possesses or shares a sexting image with the sub-
ject's permission does no harm at all. On the other hand, a teen-
ager who maliciously or negligently shares an image without the
subject's permission does cause harm, and does commit a wrong
worthy of punishment. A sexter who subjects an unwilling recipient
to unwanted messages should also be punished. These types of non-
consensual sexting fall outside the scope of this Note's proposed
reform precisely because they may merit criminal condemnation.
Consensual sexting is different. It may be distasteful, thoroughly
foolish, and risky. However, because it is not malicious and does not
harm others, it should not be criminally punishable.
118. IMMANUEL KANr, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 195 (W. Hastie trans., 1887) (emphasis in
original).
119. Id. (emphasis in original).
120. The same argument applies to the worry that child molesters may use sexting images
to groom minors for abuse. This is clearly a harm, but one caused not by sexting itself, but
rather by the misuse of sexting images by a third party. See supra notes 104-05 and accompa-
nying text.
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2. The Insufficiency of Traditional Justifications for Punishment
Once a crime is committed, punishment may be justified by a
number of policy considerations, including deterrence, incapacita-
tion, reform, and retribution. 21 However, these traditional justifica-
tions for criminal punishment do not legitimize punishment of
consensual teen sexting.
Retribution justifies criminal punishment as a means of repaying
one harm with another. 122 As Kant argued, "it may be said: '[i]f you
slander another, you slander yourself; if you steal from another, you
steal from yourself; if you strike another, you strike yourself; if you
kill another, you kill yourself.' "123 When a person inflicts harm on
others, the state is justified in inflicting equivalent harm on the of-
fender. But consensual sexting harms no one, with the possible ex-
ception of the subjects themselves. To punish a consensual sexter is
to say "if you harm yourself, the state will harm you as well." Rather
than repaying a harm, the response simply increases it. With no
wrongful harm, there can be no proper interest in retribution.
Incapacitation is focused on preventing repeated offenses and
their attendant harms. 124 In nearly all cases, incapacitation through
criminal punishment is focused on preventing future harm to soci-
ety, rather than protecting criminal defendants from their own mis-
behavior. 125 Rare exceptions to this rule include drug laws and
prohibitions on suicide. 2 6 Criminal bans on suicide have declined
in recent years, 127 and drug laws are a response to very different
interests from those involved in consensual teen sexting, such as
concerns about addiction and the correlation between drug use
and the commission of other crimes.128 Drug laws thus seek to pre-
vent serious harm to parties other than the defendant. Absent some
121. Kent Greenwalt, Punishment, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CIME ANDJUSTICE 1282, 1286-87
(Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002).
122. Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND
THE EMOTIONS 179, 179-82 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1988) ("The distinctive aspect of re-
tributionism is that the moral desert of an offender is a sufficient reason to punish him or
her.").
123. See KANr, supra note 118, at 196.
124. See GREENWALT, supra note 121, at 1287.
125. Id. (noting that criminal punishment "puts convicted criminals out of general
circulation").
126. Cf Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REv. 229, 230 (1998) (noting
that drug laws are a form of paternalism); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 711
(1997) ("[F]or over 700 years, the Anglo-American common-law tradition has punished or
otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide.").
127. See, e.g., Shelly A. Cassity, Note, To Die or Not to Die: The History and Future of Assisted
Suicide Laws in the U.S., 2009 UTAH L. REv. 515, 521 (2009) (discussing increasing openness to
physician-assisted suicide).
128. See Michael Tonry, Research on Drugs and Crime, 13 CRIME ANO JUSTICF 1 (1990).
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showing of acute concerns like these, sexting does not merit crimi-
nal sanctions under an incapacitation theory.
The remaining justifications are deterrence and reform. Deter-
rence is the interest in preventing people who have not committed
crimes from doing So. 1 2 9 As related to teen sexting, even if we take
an expansive view of deterrence, including prevention of both
harm to society and self-harm to the offender, it is unclear that
criminal law is the best tool for the job. We generally assume that
people know the law and expect them to conform their behavior to
it. This assumption is aspirational for any segment of the popula-
tion, but all the more so for minors. 130 If teenagers are unaware of





As applied to consensual teen sexting, both deterrence and the
remaining justification, reform, 132 can only be motivated by pater-
nalism-the desire to prevent people from making choices that the
law views as self-destructive. Paternalism is an accepted legal interest
in the realm of legislation to protect minors. 33 However, it is not
generally used to justify criminal punishment of minors who place
themselves in danger. Instead, paternalism by the state may justify
punishment of parents who allow their children to enter potentially
harmful situations, 34 or it may motivate lesser sanctions for minors
themselves, such as in-school discipline. 135 Criminal punishment is
itself a harm, 3 6 and thus fits very poorly with the protective aims of
paternalism.
Furthermore, it is unclear that criminal sanctions serve a state's
paternalistic interest in preventing sexting. As Part IV of this Note
argues, other methods may better advance the goal of prevention.
Although states are not obligated to find perfect methods to solve
129. See GREENWALT, supra note 121, at 1286.
130. Stephen F. Smith, Jailfor Juvenile Child Pornographers?: A Response to Professor Leay, 15
VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 505, 533 (2008) ("Although the media has widely broadcast stories of
minors being charged for creating and disseminating [sexting] images, minors continue to
create such images, undeterred by the prospect of prosecution.").
131. One response to this is to educate teenagers about the law. However, there are two
issues with this approach. First, criminalization of teen sexting is unjustified on other
grounds, so this is only a partial solution to a larger problem. Second, a focus on criminaliza-
tion of sexting by minors may merely encourage teenagers to postpone sexting until adult-
hood, when it is completely legal, but maintains the same risk of reputational harm.
132. See GREENWALT, supra note 121, at 1287.
133. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944).
134. Id. at 169-70.
135. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405-07 (2007).
136. See GRE, vALrT, supra note 121, at 1283 ("Since punishment involves pain or depriva-
tion that people wish to avoid, its intentional imposition by the state requires justification.").
[VOL. 46:2
Decriminalizing Consensual Teen Sexting
social problems,137 these practical concerns combine with the theo-
retical concerns outlined above to cast serious doubt on the utility
of criminal sexting laws. Overall, criminalization of consensual teen
sexting is not justifiable policy.
Moving sexting cases from the criminal to the juvenile justice sys-
tem mitigates, but does not eliminate, these concerns. Historically,
juvenile courts operated on "the principle that rehabilitation is a
better response to delinquency than the punishment and stigma
that generally accompany an adult conviction." 138 Though this re-
mains an important goal of the juvenile justice system, juvenile
courts have taken on an increasingly retributivist philosophy over
the past several decades.13 9 Although designed to handle juvenile
offenders in a more age-appropriate manner, juvenile proceedings
are nonetheless a method of punishing wrongs. Even if the punitive
harm ofjuvenile prosecution is less severe, purely paternalistic con-
cerns cannot justify condemning teenage sexters in this way. The
interest in proportionality still applies-if no punishment can be
justified without culpable harm, then punishment without harm is
unjustified whether the punishment is lenient or severe. Further-
more, relying on the juvenile justice system to curb teen sexting is
impractical: with between 4 and 20 percent of teenagers involved in
sexting,140 funneling sexters into juvenile court could potentially
create millions of new youthful offenders.
III. PROPOSED REFORM
As the foregoing demonstrates, teen sexting cases should be re-
moved from the criminal and juvenile justice systems. States should
reform their laws to stop criminal prosecution of teenagers for con-
sensual sexting, and instead create programs designed to confront
the issue outside of criminal courts. This section offers a proposal
for decriminalizing consensual teen sexting.
137. As a constitutional matter, states are entitled to some judicial deference in their
choice of criminal sanctions. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182-83 (1976); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 251 (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that courts may not "invalidate a
category of penalties because [they] may deem less severe penalties adequate to serve the
ends of penology"). However, this deference is subject to limits. Id. at 183.
138. Kristin Henning, What's Wrong With Victims'Rights in Juvenile Court?: Retributive Versus
Rehabilitative Systems of Justice, 97 CALIF. L. REv. 1107, 1112 (2009).
139. See id. at 1113.
140. See studies cited supra note 8.
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Although there appears to be a growing consensus in the states
that prosecution of teen sexting under child pornography laws de-
signed for adults is inappropriate,14' current state law does not do
enough to protect teenagers' rights and wellbeing. 142 The ultimate
goal of teen sexting law should be the protection of minors, both
from harm at the hands of others and from the equally real threat
of harm by an overly zealous justice system. The model statute be-
low removes all criminal liability for consensual teen sexting while




a. "Sexting" shall be defined as the transmission of sexually
explicit or sexually suggestive images or video, intended
for private use, via a digital medium which affords a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy, including but not limited
to a personal cellular phone or e-mail account.
b. A "sexting image" shall be defined as a sexually explicit
or sexually suggestive image or video, intended for pri-
vate use, transmitted via a digital medium which affords
a reasonable expectation of privacy, including but not
limited to a personal cellular phone or e-mail account.
2. No minor shall be subject to criminal prosecution or
equivalent juvenile proceedings for the creation or private
possession of a sexually explicit or sexually suggestive digi-
tal image of himself or herself.
3. No person shall be subject to criminal prosecution or
equivalent juvenile proceedings for the creation or trans-
mission via sexting of any sexting image, including sexting
images depicting a minor, if the following criteria are met:
a. If the sexting image depicts only the sender:
i. The sender is a minor, or is no more than three years
older than the recipient; and
ii. The sender reasonably believes the recipient is will-
ing to receive the image.
141. See supra Part I.B.2.
142. See supra Part II.
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b. If the sexting image depicts a person other than the
sender:
i. The image was created with the subject's knowledge
and consent;
ii. The image was transmitted with the subject's knowl-
edge and consent;
iii. The difference in age between the subject and the
sender is no more than three years;
iv. The difference in age between the subject and the
recipient is no more than three years; and
v. The sender reasonably believes the recipient is will-
ing to receive the image.
4. No person shall be subject to criminal prosecution or
equivalent juvenile proceedings for the private possession
of a sexting image depicting a minor if:
a. The image was created with the subject's knowledge and
consent;
b. The image was possessed with the subject's knowledge
and consent; and
c. The difference in age between the subject and the pos-
sessor is no more than three years.
5. A minor who lawfully possesses a sexting image shall not be
prosecuted as an adult for unlawfully sharing the image via
sexting and, if convicted as a juvenile, shall not be required
to register as a sex offender.
6. A minor who unlawfully possesses a sexting image shall not
be prosecuted as an adult for this unlawful possession and,
if convicted as a juvenile, shall not be required to register as
a sex offender.
7. Nothing in this act shall be interpreted to:
a. Decriminalize the possession of commercial child por-
nography, the sale or publication in any publicly accessi-
ble forum of any sexually explicit image involving a
minor, or the sexual exploitation of minors;
b. Prohibit the use of a legal sexting image as evidence in a
prosecution for crimes unrelated to the use or posses-
sion of the image, including cases when the activity de-
picted in the image is alleged to be illegal; or
c. Reduce civil remedies available to a minor whose image
is unlawfully created or shared.
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B. Explanation
This statute aims to protect teenagers from the most serious po-
tential harms of sexting while also preventing inappropriate legal
interference in victimless teenage behavior. When sexting is con-
sensual, the harm of prosecution, and especially of convictions car-
rying the possibility of jail time and sex offender registration, far
outweighs the possibility of harm from the activity itself. The statute
therefore exempts from prosecution nearly all instances of fully
consensual sexting between minors. Sections three and four con-
tain "Romeo and Juliet" provisions, which decriminalize sexting be-
tween minors and young adults, as long as the age difference
between the parties is no more than three years.
143
The statute does not remove all teen sexting cases from the reach
of the criminal law. Cases where sexting is not voluntary, either on
the part of the subject or the recipient, remain subject to criminal
sanction. This includes cases where the subject did not consent to
the creation of the sexting image144 and cases where the sender did
not reasonably believe that the recipient would have consented to
receive the image. 145 Because of the potential harm to minors' rep-
utations if sexting images are created and circulated without their
consent, the statute requires affirmative consent by the subject to
creation and sharing of any teen sexting image. On the other hand,
teenagers often casually share sexting images, and the potential
harm from receiving unwanted images from a sender who acts with-
out malice is less than the harm of being photographed without
consent. The sharing provisions therefore only require a reasonable
belief that the recipient would have consented to receiving the
images.146 This provision aims to leave intact the possibility of prose-
cution for senders whose actions constitute intentional harassment.
The Romeo and Juliet provisions provide flexibility to the law's
application to sexting between older teenagers and young adults,
but they also function as an important limitation on consent. These
provisions make consent to sexting inapplicable in cases where the
age difference between the subject of a sexting image and either
the sender or the recipient of the image is greater than three years.
143. These provisions are common in statutory rape law and either decriminalize sex with
a minor if the two parties are close in age or else reduce penalties in that situation. See, e.g.,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West 2008) (reducing statutory rape penalties for sex between
parties within three years of age). I have selected three years as a reasonable number with
precedent in statutory rape law, but states could vary the permissible age difference.
144. Model statute § 3(b)(i).
145. Model statute §§ 3(a)(ii), 3(b)(v).
146. Id.
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The goal of this limitation is to exclude situations where older peers
pressure a young teenager or child into agreeing to sexting.
The model statute also maintains existing civil and criminal pro-
tections for minors when sexual images of them are either created
or shared without their consent. It allows for the criminalization of
any possession of a sexual image of a minor without the subject's
consent,147 and of any publication or sale of sexual images of a mi-
nor, regardless of consent.1 48 It thus protects the subjects of sexting
images from criminal liability for lapses in judgment, but also aims
to minimize the negative consequences of those lapses by restrict-
ing the circulation of sexting images.
In cases where a sexting image depicts activity that is illegal
under laws other than those dealing with child pornography, the
statute ensures that teen sexting images may still be used in prose-
cution for that crime, but not criminalized in their own right.
149
The statute should have no effect on the ability of courts and prose-
cutors to punish traditional, exploitative child pornography. It en-
sures that exploitation of children by adults does not constitute
protected activity through the consent requirement for creation,
transmission, and possession of sexting images; the limitation on
the permissible age difference between the subject of an image and
any other party involved in sexting; and the exemption from pro-
tection for publication or sale of the images. If in practice the stat-
ute hampers prosecution of adults for child pornography, it should
be revised.
The goal of the model statute is to create a complete exemption
from criminal prosecution for consensual teen sexting, without pro-
viding legal amnesty for adult predators or increasing the general
availability of child pornography. The statute is designed to work
alongside existing criminal and civil law dealing with child pornog-
raphy and sexual harassment, not to impair the availability of re-
dress for minors whose images are shared without their consent.
147. Model statute § 4(b). Early readers of this Note have commented that a person who
receives a sexting image from a sender other than the subject of the image may not know if
they possess the image with the subject's consent, and may unwittingly commit a crime. This
is true. It might be reasonable to exempt nonconsensual possession of teen sexting images
from criminalization when the possessor has a good-faith belief that the subject has con-
sented. However, that situation is not a form of consensual teen sexting and therefore falls
outside the scope of this Note's reform. Absent such an exemption, prosecutors have discre-
tion to decline to press charges against people who possess sexting images with a good-faith
belief in the subject's consent.
148. Model statute § 7(b).
149. Model statute § 7(a).
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IV. RESPONSE TO OBJECTIONS
The most likely objection to this Note's proposed reform is that
decriminalizing teen sexting will make it more difficult to deter
teens from engaging in this risky behavior. Critics might argue that
decriminalizing teen sexting will remove the stigma associated with
the activity, leading teenagers to believe that it is socially accept-
able. They might also argue that the threat of criminal sanction is
the only way to prevent more teenagers from engaging in sexting.
However, there are means outside the criminal law to provide teen-
agers with both moral guidance and practical consequences for en-
gaging in sexting.
While decriminalizing consensual teen sexting removes one tool
in the effort to control the activity, it does not leave adults power-
less to do so. Instead, the task properly falls to parents and educa-
tors to inform teenagers about the potential dangers of sexting and
prevent the abuse of technology. Teachers and parents have both
the ability and the broad legal authority to punish teenagers who
cause harm or disruption through sexting. The states can reinforce
the authority of teachers and parents by developing educational
programs modeled on existing preventative programs that address
other issues affecting teenagers, such as sex education, drug abuse,
and bullying.
A. The Role of Parents and Schools
Leaving sexting prevention to parents and educators rather than
to courts is both legally and socially appropriate. As a legal matter,
courts have clearly affirmed the roles of parents and schools in
guiding the moral upbringing of children. 150 Outside the courts, it
is established social practice that schools and parents share a lead-
ing role in education and risk prevention in areas that are substan-
tially similar to teen sexting.
1 5 1
Subjects similar to teen sexting that are generally handled in
homes or schools rather than courts include sexual education
152
150. See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158 (1944); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
151. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
152. In a 1999 survey, 72 percent of fifth and sixth grade teachers reported that sexual
education was taught at their schools in one or both of those grades. David J. Landry et al.,
Sexuality Education in Fifth and Sixth Grades in U.S. Public Schools, 1999, 32 FAMILY PLANNING
PERSPECTIVES 212, 213 (2000), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/
3221200.html.
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and preventative programs dealing with drug abuse 15 3 and bully-
ing. 5 4 While drug abuse prevention programs aim to prevent fu-
ture criminal offenses by children and teenagers, 155 bullying and
sexual education programs use education to protect minors from
harms that generally do not rise to the level of crimes 156 If consen-
sual sexting were decriminalized, sexting prevention programs
could largely resemble programs that target bullying and sex educa-
tion. Sexting prevention programs should focus on providing teen-
agers with information on the potential hazards of sexting and
strategies to avoid harm to themselves and others.
Teen sexting is an area that implicates teenagers' judgment as
well as their developing sense of morality. In this sense, sexting is
similar to drug use and sexual activity because the primary goal of
preventative programs is not to keep teenagers from harming
others, 157 but to provide them with the tools they need to protect
themselves from harm.158 This is a particularly valuable goal in the
area of teen sexting. Under current constitutional law, consensual
sexting may only be criminalized if it involves minors; however the
harms implicated by sexting, including emotional distress and
reputational damage, remain relevant to legal sexting among
153. Drug Abuse Resistance Education, a well-known youth anti-drug education program,
is currently used in 75 percent of America's school districts. About D.A.R.E., D.A.R.E., http://
www.dare.com/home/about_dare.asp (last visited May 1, 2012).
154. Key Components in State Anti-Bullying Laws, STOPBUUXING.GOV, http://www.stopbully
ing.gov/laws/index.html (last visited May 1, 2012) (outlining responses to bullying that em-
phasize school intervention, preventative education, and family notification).
155. The D.A.R.E. Mission, D.A.R.E., http://www.dare.com/home/THEDAREMISSION.
asp (last visited May 1, 2012) ("D.A.R.E. (Drug Abuse Resistance Education) is a collaborative
program in which local law enforcement and local schools join together to educate students
about the personal and social consequences of substance abuse and violence.").
156. In some cases, however, bullying and sexual activity may involve harms that are also
crimes. For example, bullying may rise to the level of assault or harassment. See 2 Middle School
Bullies Charged, Released In Case Of Anti-Gay Assault That Left Victim Blind In One Eye, CBS NEW
YoRK (July 13, 2012, 7:26 PM), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2012/07/13/2-middle-school-
bullies-charged-released-in-case-of-anti-gay-assault-that-left-victim-blind-in-one-eye/ (report-
ing that a teenager was physically assaulted in an "anti-gay hate crime"); Charles Hack, Ba-
yonne mother files harassment charge against alleged bullies, charges school administration hasn't done
enough to protect to her son, who has a heart ailment, NJ.cOM (Oct. 12, 2011; 7:16 AM), http://
www.nj.com/joumal-news/index.ssf/2011/10/bayonne-mother-files.harassmen.html. Sex-
ual activity by minors may also be criminalized under statutory rape law. Smith, supra note
130, at 525-26 & nn.75-76. However, these cases are outliers, and educational programs on
sexuality and bullying generally aim to prevent the broader category of harms rather than
just those that rise to the level of crimes.
157. See McLaughlin, supra note 51 at 138-40 (noting that most teen sexting is not in-
tended to cause harm to others).
158. See Smith, supra note 130, at 544 ("Minors who distribute pornographic images of
themselves place may [sic] themselves at risk of being victimized by pedophiles or sexual
predators and create potential problems for themselves among their peers.").
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adults. 159 If fear of prosecution is the only thing that reinforces re-
sponsible behavior in this area, young adults may lack the informa-
tion they need to avoid the other risks associated with sexting. If, on
the other hand, adolescents learn that responsible technology use
can have lifelong benefits, good habits may last into adulthood.
Of course, in cases where sexting is not consensual, it is harmful
to people other than the sexter and may properly be criminalized.
Thus, in addition to discussing the potential self-harm of consen-
sual sexting, educators should emphasize both the moral duty to
refrain from harming others through nonconsensual sexting and
the fact that nonconsensual sexting is often subject to criminal
sanctions.
Teen sexting also strongly resembles drug use, bullying, and sex-
ual activity in that it impacts a large number of teenagers. 6° Effec-
tive preventative programs are therefore essential in all of these
areas. Individualized responses to any of these issues, whether in
the form of prosecution or case-by-case intervention, would be ex-
tremely resource-intensive.' 6' Without preventative programs in
place to deal with sexting, local officials selectively prosecute the
159. Tyler Clementi, who committed suicide after video of him in a sexual encounter was
shared without his consent, was eighteen years old at the time of the incident. Schwartz, supra
note 16. That case is better understood as cyberbullying than sexting, since the video in
question was maliciously created and shared without Mr. Clementi's knowledge. See id. How-
ever, the case demonstrates the power of sexual images over the lives of people who are no
longer minors. Similarly, the risk of reputational harm remains whether the subject of a
sexting image is a teenager or an adult.
160. In a 2003 study, 40.2 percent of respondents in grades nine to twelve had used mari-
juana at least once, and over 7.5 million teenagers reported having used some type of illegal
drug in their lifetime. How Significant is Teen Drug Use?, NATIONAL DRUG INTELLIGENCE
CENTER, http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubsl1/12430/index.htm#significant (last visited May
1, 2012). The American Psychological Association reports that 70 percent of middle school
and high school students have experienced bullying at some point. Bullying: A Module for
Teachers, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, http://www.apa.org/education/k12/bully
ing.aspx# (last visited May 1, 2012). Finally, a 2011 study found that 43 percent of unmarried
teenage girls and 42 percent of unmarried teenage boys had had sexual intercourse. U.S.
DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, TEENAGERS IN THE UNITED STATES: SEXUAL ACTIrY,
CONTRACEPTIVE USE, AND CHILDBEARING, 2006-2010 NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH
(Oct. 2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23-031.pdf. Cf SEX
AND TECH: RESULTS FROM A SURVEY OF TEENS AND YOUNG ADULTS, supra note 8 (reporting that
20 percent of teenagers age thirteen to nineteen reported electronically sending or posting
online nude or semi-nude images or video of themselves).
161. Diversion programs through juvenile courts are a relatively inexpensive individual
response to teen misbehavior. Attendance in a diversion program costs, on average, $936 per
youthful offender. Peter Greenwood, Prevention and Intervention Programs for Juvenile Offenders,
18 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 185, 194 (2008), available at http://www.princeton.edu/futureof
children/publications/docs/18_02_09.pdf. More resource-intensive options such as juvenile
sex offender therapy cost up to $33,000. Id. at 193. By comparison, school-based preventative
programs may cost less than $5 per student. Our Products, KEEP A CLEAR MIND, http://www.
keepaclearmind.com/our.products.php (last visited May 1, 2012).
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tiny fraction of teenagers unlucky enough to be caught. This leaves
hundreds of thousands of teenagers engaged in potentially harmful
behavior, often unaware of the attendant risks. Educational pro-
grams can more effectively guide teenagers' behavior by targeting
all teenagers rather than only the few who are prosecuted for
sexting.
In addition to the more traditional spheres of sex education,
drug abuse awareness, and bullying prevention, sexting also bears a
number of similarities to another emerging misuse of technology by
teenagers: cyberbullying. 162 Like sexting, cyberbullying is a growing
trend among teenagers, but may be all but invisible to parents and
school authorities who are less familiar with new technology.
Cyberbullying has attracted attention in the past few years,
largely due to a few high profile cases where it led to extreme and
tragic results.163 In response, many states have created or increased
legal penalties for cyberbullying.'6 Federal law, meanwhile, man-
dates that schools receiving certain federal funds educate students
about cyberbullying, 165 and a number of school districts have cre-
ated educational programs designed to prevent the behavior and
provide resources for victims.
1 66
Sexting and cyberbullying have a great deal in common, and, in
some cases, nonconsensual sharing of sexting images may be a form
of cyberbullying. 167 In areas where preventative educational pro-
grams dealing with cyberbullying are already a part of the curricu-
lum, information about sexting should be added as a related unit.
In school districts where no such program exists, information about
sexting may be incorporated into life skills classes or programs deal-
ing with any of the other issues teenagers commonly face.
Beyond guiding teenagers' behavior through education, schools
may also properly deter sexting by punishing sexting that occurs in
school or disrupts school activity. While it is canonical that students
do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate,"168 public school officials none-
theless enjoy broad discretion in the means they use to maintain an
162. " 'Cyberbullying' describes the use of the Internet to bully peers." Renee L.
Servance, Cyberbullying, Cyber-harassment, and the Conflict Between Schools and the First Amendment,
2003 Wis. L. REv. 1213, 1218 (2003).
163. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 16.
164. See Alison Virginia King, Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws: Keeping the Online Play-
ground Safe for Both Teens and Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 845, 858 (2010).
165. See id. at 881.
166. See id.
167. See Schwartz, supra note 16.
168. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
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effective educational environment. 169 Thus, school discipline may,
without legal impediment, target speech that falls outside the reach
of the criminal law. 170 Schools' legal authority to discipline students
for speech remains limited to circumstances that affect the school
environment, 17' meaning that school discipline cannot and should
not reach all cases of teen sexting. Nonetheless, school discipline in
conjunction with education about sexting is a useful, legal tool for
combating teen sexting.
The authority of parents to combat teen sexting is even broader
than that of schools. Because parents are not state actors, the Con-
stitution places no limits on their authority over their children, and
they may take any disciplinary action that does not run afoul of
other laws. 172 Furthermore, the power of the law to curtail parental
authority is limited by constitutional doctrine that affords parents
the right to guide the moral development of their children free
from undue interference by the state. 173 Legally, parents thus have
the broadest power to combat sexting by their children. They also
have a superior practical ability to do so by controlling children's
access to technology and monitoring their usage. 174
However, parents may be less technologically savvy than their
teenage children, and they may need assistance in knowing when
and how to set boundaries. Therefore, effective sexting prevention
programs will include not only education for teenagers, but also
information for their parents on how to monitor and protect their
children as they venture into the digital realm. The next section
169. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 3 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 687 (1986) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (discussing "the discretion school officials have to teach high school students
how to conduct civil and effective public discourse, and to prevent disruption of school edu-
cational activities").
170. Id. at 688 ("If respondent had given the same speech outside of the school environ-
ment, he could not have been penalized simply because government officials considered his
language to be inappropriate.").
171. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401, 405-06 (2006) (noting that "[t]here is
some uncertainty at the outer boundaries as to when courts should apply school speech
precedents," but holding that school disciplinary reach extended at least to an off-campus
school-sponsored event during school hours).
172. Cf Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) ("[T]he principle has become firmly
embedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited by the first section of the Four-
teenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States.").
173. See supra Part II.A.2.
174. FAMILY ONLINE SAFETY INSTITUTE, WHo NEEDS PARENTAL CONTROLS? A SURVEY OF
AWARENESS, ATTITUDES, AND USE OF ONLINE PARENTAL CONTROLS 3, 10 (2011), available at
http://www.fosi.org/images/stories/research/fosi hartsurvey-report.pdf (finding that 93
percent of parents surveyed had set rules for their children's technology use and that 82
percent of parents found it easy or fairly easy to supervise their children's use of the
Internet).
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briefly outlines ways in which states can support parents and school
districts in their efforts to curb sexting.
B. State Support in Curbing Teen Sexting
While criminal sanctions are not an appropriate means by which
to control teen sexting, state legislatures can still play a role in cur-
tailing the activity by providing schools and parents financial sup-
port, information, and guidance on the implementation of
preventative programs.
Recognizing the need for preventative programs aimed at teen
sexting, a few states have begun establishing educational programs
to target the practice. 175 Because these programs are all relatively
new, no research exists yet as to what types of programs are effective
in preventing teen sexting. There are, however, studies that help
identify effective educational programs in areas such as sex educa-
tion and drug and alcohol abuse prevention. 176 Schools and legisla-
tors can therefore model programs targeting sexting on effective
youth education programs on other subjects.
State legislators seeking to prevent teen sexting can provide
funding for preventative education programs and help to set the
curriculum for these programs. Until more studies are conducted
showing what types of programs are effective in stemming sexting,
they should look to other programs that have seen success. Some of
these programs have succeeded in preventing drug use and other
dangerous behavior among teenagers by encouraging collaboration
between families and schools. One successful program has parents
attend trainings,' 77 while another sends home educational activities
for students to do with their parents. 178 When teenagers and their
parents learn together about the potential harms of sexting, par-
ents will have the tools to monitor their children's behavior more
effectively, and teenagers will know that their parents are aware of
the issue and can hold them accountable for inappropriate
behavior.
175. E.g., S. 407, 2011 Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011); A08131, 2011 Reg. Sess (N.Y. 2011);
S. 2907, 214th Leg., Reg. Sess. (NJ. 2011); S. 0152, 2010 Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2010).
176. See, e.g., Alternatives to the Failed DARE (Drug Abuse Resistance Education) Program, ALCO-
HOL PROBLEMS ANsD SOLUTIONS, http://www2.potsdam.edu/hansondj/Controversies/
20070111184521.html (last visited May 1, 2012).
177. See Middle School FAST, FAMILIES AND SCHOOLS TOGETHER INC., http://www.families
andschools.org/programs/middle-school-fast.php (last visited May 1, 2012).
178. See Our Products, KEEP A CLEAR MIND, http://www.keepaclearmind.com/our_
products.php (last visited May 1, 2012).
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CONCLUSION
Technology use is an area in which teenagers need guidance con-
cerning safe and appropriate behavior. It is both fair and prudent
to subject teenagers who use cellular phones and the Internet to
adult-set limits. However, the policy in many states of attempting to
deter consensual teen sexting through criminal or juvenile prosecu-
tions is not a proper response to the problem.
Prosecution of consensual teen sexting raises serious issues of
both law and policy. Rather than threatening a few unlucky teenag-
ers with severe punishment for a widespread and victimless activity,
states should focus prosecutions on cases of nonconsensual sexting.
Consensual sexting should be dealt with in a manner that respects
teenagers' legal rights to free speech and privacy. Anti-sexting mea-
sures should encourage all teenagers to make informed choices
when using technology, rather than simply punishing the small mi-
nority of teenage sexters who happen to get caught. Educational
programs should not only reach out to teenagers but also enlist the
support of parents and educators. If adults tasked with teenagers'
wellbeing and moral development are informed about the risks of
sexting, they can better guide teenagers' use of technology and pre-
vent many of the harms of sexting without the heavy-handed and
harmful interference of criminal law.
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